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Powerfully  resonating with  the  life of the Justice  whose  center hosts
this  lecture,  Reva  Siegel's  important  Brennan  Lecture  interprets  key his-
torical experiences in order to help  us understand how democracy  and con-
stitutionalism can  and do connect.  Siegel channels Justice Brennan's good
cheer  when  she  recasts  our failure  to  amend  the  Constitution  to prohibit
sex-based discrimination as not only a de facto success,  but also as an illus-
tration of a vibrant constitutional culture. Like Justice Brennan, who had an
uncanny  ability to  make  each  interlocutor feel uniquely  heard  and impor-
tant,  Siegel  offers  each  reader  the  role  of potential  constitutional  re-
fresher:  we  each  can  play  a  role  in the  social  movements  and  counter-
movements that revitalize constitutional meaning. Despite Siegel's explicit
claim  that  hers  is  a modest  enterprise,  we  find ourselves  blinking  in  the
brightness of a re-envisioned constitutional landscape.
I  will  first restate her  central  argument,  and  then  ask two questions.
Professor  Siegel  identifies  social  movements  as  central  channels  in  the
navigation between  the sometimes  divergent goals of self-government  and
legal order. Social movements  construct informal pathways for democratic
responsiveness  by  debating  Supreme  Court  nominations  and  proposing
largely  unsuccessful  constitutional  amendments.  In this process,  people-
"The People"--contribute  to the project of constitutional  interpretation.
Siegel asserts that by using these  informal pathways  as focal points of
self-government,  social  movements revitalize  the Constitution.  By partici-
pating  in rallies,  giving and attending  speeches, proposing  even successful
Copyright  ©  2006  California  Law  Review,  Inc.  California  Law  Review,  Inc.  (CLR)  is  a
California  nonprofit  corporation.  CLR  and the  authors  are  solely  responsible  for  the  content  of their
publications.
I  Jeremiah  Smith, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard  Law School.
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constitutional amendments,  wearing t-shirts and writing elected representa-
tives,  participants  can  address  their  arguments  about  constitutional
meaning  to  both  fellow  citizens and  government  officials.'  Siegel's  story
emphasizes  the  democratic  significance  of  what  she  calls  "identity
formation and deliberation."2 For example,  as people participate  in a social
movement  advocating  rights  for members  of racial  minorities  or  women,
they  claim  and  simultaneously  help  to  construct  self-understandings  as
members  of particular  groups  and  as  people  entitled  to recognition  and
rights  based on  that membership.  At the  same time, their  discussions  and
arguments  within  and  beyond  their  own  group  generate  priorities  and
norms. Movements  connect practical questions with symbolism in order to
motivate people to political  action such as voting, passing out leaflets,  dis-
playing  a  bumper  sticker,  joining  a  public  demonstration,  and  donating
money or time to the cause.
Siegel's boldest claim is that the pathways  to constitutional participa-
tion she identifies actually discipline democratic participation by requiring
speech  instead  of violence.  The  specific  demand  is  to  use  constitutional
speech.  Its use, in turn,  strengthens both self-government  and the Constitu-
tion. The  norms and practices  of constitutional speech  demand that people
appeal to  shared commitments  already present  in our constitutional  under-
standings, and that they pay respect to legal authorities and rule of law val-
ues.'  These constraints  channel  conflict to  ensure that  it "vitalize[s]  rather
than  undermine[s]  the  system,"4  and  promotes  social  integration.  Siegel
offers  examples  of her theory  in  action  in  the  movement  for the  Equal
Rights  Amendment  and  for the Nineteenth  Amendment.  As  she  does  so,
Siegel  beautifully renders portraits  of Pauli  Murray,  Tom Emerson,  Betty
Friedan, Sylvia Law, Phyllis Schlafly, and the young Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
portraits worthy of hanging alongside those of the more familiar shapers of
our Constitution. But these portraits are of the sort J.K. Rowling devised in
the Harry  Potter books: portraits  whose subjects  can move, converse,  and
visit one another within their separate frames.
Now, on to my two questions. First, are the narratives  Siegel creates,
and the pathways  they travel, really constitutional  law, or instead  are they
politics?  Siegel  emphasizes  the  fact  that  mobilized  citizens  use  elections
and  other  means  when  officials  diverge  too  far  from  the  views  held  by
1.  "Because  exercises  of constitutional  lawmaking  play  a  restricted  role  in  the  American
constitutional order-the  United States Constitution  has been  amended less than twenty times since the
founding-the  system needs institutions that enable  popular engagement with questions of constitutional
meaning  to ensure  its continuing democratic  authority,"  Reva B.  Siegel,  Constitutional  Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional  Change: The Case of the defacto ERA,  94 CALIF. L. REv.  1323,
32 (2006).
2.  Id. at  1341.
3.  Id.  at  1418.
4.  Id.
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most Americans.  What  makes this an avenue of constitutional  law,  rather
than simply politics? Siegel's reply is "semantic  constraint,"  through which
people  need  to  convert,  in  Siegel's  felicitous  phrase,  "challenges  to  the
constitutional order ...  into challenges  OF the constitutional order."6
Yet  even  this  seems  a condition  of as  much  politics  and  culture  as
law.  Social  critics work within  a culture's  traditions,  as Michael  Walzer's
work  shows.7  Early  reformers  like  Elizabeth  Cady  Stanton  positioned
themselves simultaneously  as interpreters of legal texts, religious texts, and
life experience;  they interpreted old sources in order to persuade.8 The en-
terprise of persuasion  fundamentally depends  upon convincing the  listener
that your argument connects  with something  he  or she already believes  to
be true  or a value  he  or she wants to  be known  to share.9  Legal  argument
turns this  truism into professional  practice.  But this  fact does  not convert
all  acts of persuasion  into legal reform,  nor all legal reform efforts into  at-
tempts to change constitutional meaning.
Appealing  to  a  set of ideas  or concepts  in  order  to persuade  others
may carry limitations of logic  or coherence.  Historian Eric Foner has  writ-
ten  about  how  the  reliance  on  the  tradition  of  self-ownership  by
Abolitionists  ultimately  limited  the  remedies  they  could  pursue  during
Reconstruction,  for the  same root concepts  of private  property  ownership
curbed  any  potential  redistribution  of  property  after  the  Civil  War.
Nonetheless,  the self-ownership tradition resonated  with non-activists and
assisted  the  anti-slavery  cause.' °  But  it  is  not  the  internal  limitations  of
5.  "If the  constitutional  law  that  officials  pronounced  diverges  too  far from  understanding  to
which  American  citizens  subscribe,  a mobilized  citizenry knows  how  to hold judges and  the  elected
officials who  [appoint] them to account."  Siegel,  supra note  1 at  1419.
6.  Id. at  1350 (emphasis added).
7.  MICHAEL  WALZER, INTERPRETATION  AND  SOCIAL CRITICISM  (1987).
8.  See  ELIZABETH  CADY  STANTON,  EIGHTY  YEARS  AND  MORE:  REMINISCENCES  1815-1897
(Shocken  Books reprint  1971)  (1898);  ELIZABETH  CADY  STANTON,  THE  WOMAN'S  BIBLE  (Coalition
Task  Force  on  Women  and  Religion  reprint  1974)  (1898);  See  also Lois  W.  BANNER,  ELIZABETH
CADY  STANTON:  A  RADICAL  FOR  WOMAN'S  RIGHTS  (1980)  (reviewing  Stanton's  efforts  to  draw  on
legal,  religious,  and  political sources);  Martha  Minow,  Rights of One's Own  98  HARv.  L.  REV.  1084
(1985)  (reviewing  ELISABETH  GRIFFITH,  IN  HER  OWN  RIGHT:  THE  LIFE  OF  ELIZABETH  CADY
STANTON  (1984))  (describing Stanton's use of varied arguments and sources).
9.  See  Richard  Briffault,  Our Localism: Part 11  - Localism and Legal Theory, 90  COLUM.  L.
REV.  346,  394  ("since  political  issues  are  collective  issues,  individuals  involved  in  politics  will  be
compelled to  discuss,  deliberate  and  debate  with  each  other. They  will have  to listen  to  each other's
positions,  learn  the  arts  of  persuasion  and  compromise");  Sherman  J.  Clark,  The  Character of
Persuasion, I AVE  MARIA  L.  REV.  61  (2003)  ("persuasive  argument  ...  responds  to the  concerns and
priorities of the...  [one  to be persuaded]");  see also Jerry  Frug, Argument as Character,  40  STAN.  L.
REV.  869 (1988);  Joseph  William Singer,  Persuasion,  87  MICH.  L.  REV.  2442, 2458  (1989)  (arguing
that persuasion depends upon reaching listeners'  values or connections  with others).
10.  See ERIC  FONER,  RECONSTRUTION:  AMERICA'S  UNFINISHED  REVOLUTION  1863-1977  (1988);
See also  ERIC  FONER,  THE  STORY  OF  AMERICAN  FREEDOM  (1998)  (tracing  rhetorical  and  political
struggle  for equality);  ERIC  FONER,  POLITICS AND  IDEOLOGY  IN THE  AGE  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  (1980)
(examining  Republican  ideology);  Siegel,  supra  note  I  at  1359-60.  ("The  conditions  of  the
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various  conceptions  of gender  equality  so  much  as  demands  of political
feasibility that punctuate  Siegel's  story of the ERA's  advocates and oppo-
nents.
Perhaps  legal  semantics  as  conceived  by  Siegel  constrain  when
couched  as particular appeals  to common tradition or shared  membership.
These kinds of appeals  do seem to require a  shift from the particular to the
general, translating  a partisan vision into  a public value."  This translation
effort may, of course, be purely instrumental. But it may also have the psy-
chological effect of drawing the advocate more firmly  into allegiance  with
others  seeking  to  attain  similar  legal  or political  transformations,  taming
dissent  into affiliation,  and converting  "I" into  "we."  This  is a feature  of
rights discourse that interests me. To assert a right, you have to lay claim to
the community that recognizes  that right. Paradoxically,  this necessity  can
briefly turn seeming adversaries into a community of interest."
But  again,  there  is nothing  that makes  this concept  notably constitu-
tional, and perhaps not even  specifically  legal, given the potential  sources
of rights in politics, ethics, theology, and even community practice. Appeal
to  tradition,  and  you become,  in  some  ways,  more  traditional.  Stave  off
attacks on  tradition,  and you  try, in  some  ways,  to  show that tradition  is
flexible.  That said, the accounts  of Phyllis  Shlafly's  gay-bashing  and  anti-
abortionism are reminiscent  of the narratives of transformation  and preser-
vation detailed  by Professor  Siegel in her previous work, 3 making us mar-
vel at the continuity and circularity of gender politics.
Siegel's telling depiction of the mutual accommodations made by pro-
and anti-ERA  groups"  match the familiar dynamics not only of politics but
also  of mass  markets.  Going  mainstream  makes  radicals  more  conserva-
tive. Fighting off compelling reformers  requires meeting them partway, co-
opting  them,  or  as  Bill  Clinton  liked  to  call  it,  triangulating. 5  It  is  not
Constitution's  intelligibility  constrain  changes  in its  meaning,  even  without  the  intermediation  of the
state.").
11. Siegel, supra note  I at 1359.
12.  See Martha Minow, Interpreting  Rights: An  Essay for Robert Cover, 96  YALE  LAW J.  1860
(1987);  Martha Minow, Are Rights Right for Children?, 1987 AM.  B.  FOUND.  RES. J.  203 (1987).
13.  Reva  Siegel,  Why  Equal Protection No  Longer Protects: The  Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49  STAN.  L.  REV.  1111  (1997);  Reva Siegel,  "The  Rule of  Love":  Wife Beating
as Prerogative  and Privacy, 105  YALE  L.J. 2117 (1996).
14.  See Siegel, supra  note  1 at 1360.
15.  See Ann Althouse,  The People's Court, N.Y.  TIMES  BOOK  REVIEW,  July 3,  2005, at Sec.  7 p.
8.  ("Bill  Clinton  looked  for  consensus  [judicial]  nominees,  because  he tended  to govern by  merging
divergent  interests  into triangulated  solutions.").  Some  viewed this approach  as  abandoning  his base.
"If [George W. Bush]  were Bill Clinton, you would expect him to "triangulate"-forsake his own  base
and reach  out to the  opposition,  as Clinton  did with NAFTA  and welfare reform."  See  Robert Kutner,
Bush's  Imploding  Presidency, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Oct.  29,  2005,  at  A19.  Others  treat  it  as  deft
combination  to appeal  to competing  tastes.  See Frank  Bruni,  An  Elegan Stroll in  Organ Clogs, N.Y.
TIMES,  Dec. 7,  2005,  at Fl  ("A  Batali-Batsianich menu tends  to prod  diners in new directions without
pushing them there,  providing both  moments of affirmation  for the  food snob  and easy  eating for  the
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deliberation  that emerges  as much as compromise.  Like modern  commer-
cial marketing,  the advocate  does not assume  the  listener already  has set-
tled preferences,  but instead competes with rivals to plant and coax desires,
to test which way to sell, and to undermine the appeal of alternatives.
This  discussion may just be a definitional game about where  to draw
the  line  between  law  and  politics.  But  for  contrast,  consider  the  more
overtly  legal  form  taken by  communal  dialogue  in another  constitutional
democracy.  Several months ago, while visiting Cambridge, Israeli Supreme
Court Justice Ayala Procaccia described  her court as engaged in a constant
dialogue with the public through the  media.16 Multiple  news  sources  give
daily criticism and  debate  of the court's  work.  The justices,  in turn,  each
day read the critics. The court  and the people,  in this way, are continually
and  mutually  informed.  The justice  also  noted  that  her  court  addresses
some  12,000  petitions  per  year,  in  a country  with a  population of seven
million, many from the territories.  She  said  she understands this as a kind
of continuing  exchange  with  the community.  Through  these  many deci-
sions, in the mode of a court  of equity,  the Israel  Supreme  Court builds a
stockpile of good will to be tapped when the court takes up a controversial
issue, such as the constitutionality of interrogation measures.
Compare  that workload  with the  eighty to ninety cases  heard  by our
Supreme  Court for our  population of 245 million. With its relatively  few
decisions,  our Court seems more  like an oracle  on high than a focal point
for ongoing  communal  debate  and consideration.  This very comparison  is
no doubt too court-focused for Siegel, who wants to emphasize the avenues
for constitutional culture that lie outside courts. But the judicial/nonjudicial
distinction is  not my point here.  Instead, I  mean to highlight  how  a con-
trasting  institutional  arrangement  allows  greater  public  focus  on  specifi-
cally  legal interpretation  not  only  in the  exchange between  the court  and
petitioners,  but also  in exchanges  between the  Israeli  court and media,  di-
rectly framing pressing issues for the public in terms of the legal debate.
What would be Siegel's response to this?  She could say that a specifi-
cally  legal  constitutional  culture  emerges  not  only  as  competing  groups
internalize  counterarguments,"7  but also  as the  Supreme  Court  echoes  de-
bates between mobilized social movements. For women's rights advocates,
this  includes the development  of intermediate into quasi-strict  scrutiny  for
gender classifications  under Fourteenth Amendment  equal protection juris-
prudence."  First  as a lawyer  and then  as  a Justice,  Ruth Bader Ginsburg
not only symbolizes this development but directly transmits arguments  she
food  slacker.  Mr.  Batali  and  Mr.  Bastianich  have  mastered  in  restaurants  what  Bill  Clinton  did  in
politics. They brilliantly triangulate.")
16.  Remarks of Justice Ayala Procaccia,  Harvard Law  School, Cambridge, MA, Nov. 9, 2005.
17.  Siegel, supra note  1 at  1406.
18.  Craig v. Boren, 429  U.S.  190 (1976);  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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made as an advocate to  the terms of the Supreme  Court's opinion that  she
authored  for  the Court.  Ginsburg's  appointment,  in turn,  stems  from  the
election of Bill Clinton, with Hillary  as his co-campaigner. We can look at
this as the "but-for" cause of Ginsburg's appointment itself, for it depended
upon  the  profound  cultural  shifts  in  gender  relations  over  the  past  100
years.  Cultural  changes,  technological,  geo-political,  and  economic  shifts
each played  a part, including  the development  and distribution of the con-
traceptive  pill, two  world  wars,  and  global  economic  integration.  All  of
these changes pulled more women into the paid labor force in order to sup-
port themselves and their families, and gave women both greater economic
independence  and further reasons  to  seek political  and legal voice.  All of
these trends  contributed  to  constitutional  change  and to  the  social move-
ments pressing for it. 9
Predictably,  these  achievements  triggered  successful  counter-
movements.  In the wake  of gender  struggles,  we  find  various  artifacts  of
failed reform,  such as Geduldig v. Aiello,2 "  which treated pregnancy-based
distinctions  as  non-sex  based  for  constitutional  purposes.  Particularly
poignant  for  me  are  two  cases  from  my  time  clerking  at  the  Court:
1) Michael M.  v. Superior Court of Sunoma  County, where the Court told
us that  gender differences  in the penalties  for  sex  with  minors  posed  no
constitutional  problem,  given  the  "real  differences"  between  males  and
females;2  and 2)  Rostker v.  Goldberg, where  the  Court declared that ex-
cluding  women  from military  draft  registration  is not  a problem because
military  experts  exclude  women  from combat.2 2 Depending  on what  hap-
pens  in the  next  decade  or  so,  we  may  come  to  view  these  cases  as  the
scuff marks left on the  way to  scaling the mountain,  or instead as  the me-
morials to valiant but failed efforts of reform.
Maybe  the  most specific legal residue from the  clash of social move-
ments are the explicit efforts by Justice Scalia to encourage mass mobiliza-
tion against gay rights. His may not be the first judicial  opinion to become
a fund-raising  letter, but Justice  Scalia's dissent  in Lawrence v. Texas was
ready  for photocopying  the  day  it  was released.23  Siegel  emphasizes  this
irony: when judges write  opinions  in the key of original intent, they actu-
ally jazz  up current  interest  groups  to  assault judicial  precedents.24  Once
19.  These  social, economic  and political  factors  were  factors that led  the court,  including  Chief
Justice Rehnquist,  to go along  with protections against  gender  discrimination,  Siegel,  supra note  I at
1335.  The resulting cultural shifts were well  in evidence  in the opposition to Robert Bork's nomination
to the Supreme Court-and the backpedaling of the Reagan White House in response.
20.  417  U.S. 484 (1974).
21.  450 U.S. 464 (1991).
22.  453 U.S. 57 (1981).
23.  See Siegel, supra note I at  1346.
24.  Id. at  1347.  This raises  another  question  for me: what precisely  gives  us  cause  to celebrate
when  the use  of informal  pathways  to  change  constitutional  culture  produce  talismanic  phrases,  like
"unique physical characteristics"  and "on account  of sex," that move  from judicial  opinions to ordinary
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again, I wonder what makes this constitutionalism rather than out and out
politics.
Perhaps  the  settings  of  politics  turn  debates  over  decriminalizing
same-sex  sodomy  and  gaining  equality  for  women  into  "constitutional
culture."  Some  feature  of collective  life  converts  abstract  arguments  into
meanings and practices. This hypothesis leads to my second (and I promise
shorter)  question,  investigating that  feature: Reva,  why  not  give more  at-
tention to the governance structures established by our Constitution, as you
connect  self-governance  and  constitutionalism?  You  set  aside  the  institu-
tional  dimensions, at least for now. Yet the branches and levels of govern-
ment  forged  by  the  Constitution  seem  essential  to  the  contours  of
argument,  persuasion,  culture,  and  consciousness  that  you  address.  The
disciplining effects of persuasion,  internalizing the  arguments of the  oppo-
sition,  are  wonderfully  evident  in  legislative  compromise,  as  Jeremy
Waldron emphasizes  in his argument for legislative leadership  (even if the
actual  Congress these  days  seems  locked in  the  irons of challenger-proof
districts  and  lobbyists'  money).25  Your  constitutional  discourse  rotates
around the courts. But why not include the legislative orbit, and claim it for
constitutional  culture,  as  do Robin  West,  Mark  Tushnet,  Larry  Kramer,
Larry Sager, and Jeremy Waldron?26
Similarly,  the  other  big  structure  designed  by  our  constitution-
federalism-needs  sharper  relief if we  are  to  assess  how  it  complicates
your story or confirms  it. You note, but make  little of, the fact that thirty-
five states embraced  the ERA, promoting and reflecting  transformed  ideas
of gender.  The interpretation  of those amendments  at the state  level  pro-
vided-and  still  provides-many  avenues  for  reconstituting  society  and
self-government.  Indeed,  the  ERA  looks  a  lot  more  de jure at  the  state
level. It is worth considering how that affects  the federal  level.  The redun-
dancy27 manifest  in  maintaining  both  levels  of government  affords  more
avenues  for  social  movements,  debates,  dialogue,  and  all  the  stuff that
makes  for  Siegelian  constitutional  culture.  When  Justice  Brennan
argument? These phrases  permeate  discussions far from courts, but why is this something to celebrate?
Such phrases  capture  specialized  locutions  that summarize  debates,  and  become  technical terms  that
potentially limit the flow of conversation and effectiveness of legal advocacy.
25.  JEREMY  WALDRON,  THE  DIGNITY  OF  LEGISLATION  (1999);  JEREMY  WALDRON,  LAW  AND
DISAGREEMENT (1999).
26.  See  LARRY  KRAMER,  THE  PEOPLE  THEMSELVES;  POPULAR  CONSTITUITONALISM  AND
JUDICIAL  REVIEW  (2004);  LAWRENCE  G.  SAGER,  JUSTICE  IN  PLAIN  CLOTHES: A  THEORY  OF
AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  PRACTICE  (2004);  MARK  TUSHNET,  TAKING  THE  CONSTITUTION  AWAY
FROM  THE  COURTS  (1999);  LAWRENCE  SAGER,  The  Domain  of  Constitutional Justice,  in
CONSTITUTIONALISM:  PHILOSOPHIC  FOUNDATIONS  235  (Larry  Alexander, ed.  1998); Robin  West,  The
Aspirational Constitution, 88  Nw.  U.L.  REV.  241  (1993);  Waldron,  supra  n.  25.  For a  thoughtful
treatment  of these  ideas, see  James  E.  Fleming, Judicial Review  Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking
the Constitution Seriously Ouside the Courts,  73  FORDHAM  L.  REV.  1377  (2005).
27.  See  Robert  M.  Cover,  The  Uses  of Jurisdictional  Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,  and
Innnovation,  22  WM.  & MARY  L. REV. 639 (1981).
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suggested that state supreme courts may be the best hope for future protec-
tion  of individual  rights,28  I do  not think  he  meant that those  courts  were
exclusively  qualified for this task.  Instead, they represent the  legal  plural-
ism etched  by, and  in turn  replenishing,  constitutional  culture.  Today, he
might join those who look to the federal embrace  of international  conven-
tions on women's rights as another arena of struggle and source of hope.
To acknowledge  the legal pluralism embraced  by and nourishing  our
constitutionalism,  we  should  in fact  consider  settings  beyond  the formal
federal  and  state  duality. In  the domestic  arena,  our Constitution contem-
plates  settings beyond  governmental  institutions  for both  self-governance
and public debate over values.  It preserves the public and private spheres-
including religious communities,  civil society, and nonprofit organizations,
each of which have offered arenas for contesting  gender-based  status hier-
archies  and thus expressing  and  invigorating constitutional  culture.  In this
broader  landscape,  losses  at  one  level  can  motivate  victories  at  another.
Thus, the  Supreme  Court's rejection of an  openly  gay Boy  Scout leader's
antidiscrimination  claim  against  the  Boy  Scouts-in  the  name  of  the
Scouts'  freedom  of association-has  produced  amazing  ricochet  effects
furthering  gay rights.29 Churches  and  even military bases that used to give
the  Scouts  a  place to meet  have closed  their  doors. Gay  rights  advocates
have found sympathetic  allies who would not otherwise have come forward
had the Court  ruled against  the Scouts. With those local  alliances comes a
long-term  change  in consciousness.  Struggles in religious communities  for
over gender equality and treatment of sexual minorities parallel those in the
secular  world.  The  interactions  between  these  worlds  amplify,  and  also
complicate, Siegel's picture.
We  could  imagine  constituting  the  relationships  among  these  large
and small  scale spheres  even more tightly to see how that would affect the
dynamics  of change.  Consider  the  federalist  system's  emerging  develop-
ments  in international  law.  The International Criminal Court's (ICC) juris-
diction  is directly  cabined by the ability and willingness of member  states
to pursue  the  violations  of human  rights  the  court  is  meant to  address.3"
Such  domestic  actions  will  advance  the  movement  for international  law
with  highly  visible  indictments  and  trials  in the  ICC.  But even  more  so,
international  criminal  law will  be  strengthened  by redress  pursued  at  the
domestic  level by member  states.  Because the  ICC itself cannot prosecute
when the nation state takes up the task,3  the creation of the ICC gives new
28.  William  J.  Brennan  Jr.,  The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians  of Individual Rights, 61  N.Y.U.  L. REv.  535 (1986).
29.  Boy Scouts of America v.  Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
30.  Rome Statute of the International  Criminal Court, July  17,  1998, 37 I.L.M.  999 (1998).
31.  For statement of the principle of complementarity, through which the Court defers to member
states  if  those  member  states  proceed  with  prosecutions  within  the  Court's  jurisdiction,  see  id.,
Preamble, Article 1.
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leverage  to  advocates  for  change  within  nations.  In  fact,  high  profile
international  codes will be few if law and justice grow as hoped  for at the
member-state  level, for the formal  court is designed  to promote the devel-
opment of national  level law  and institutions to punish and deter genocide,
crimes  against  humanity,  and  violations  of human  rights.  What  if  we
analogously understood American  states, localities, religions, and nonprofit
organizations,  similarly,  as  sites  for  strengthened  constitutional  enforce-
ment?  Slender  and  maybe  even  failed  efforts  before  the  Supreme  Court
could trigger and signal something bigger and deeper going on in the states
and in private realms. In any  case, Siegel's constitutional  culture  does and
must operate  in the nooks  and  crannies  of church basements,  PTA meet-
ings, private employers'  flex time and  day care  programs;  in  the decision
of a  mayor  to  perform  same-sex  marriages;  and  in the  capillaries  of the
body politic.
Hence, our constitution  explicitly established governance structures  in
the distinct but coordinated branches  and the dual sovereignty  of state and
national governments.  The Constitution's  substantive  rights presumed and
invigorated  the  private  governance  structures  of  voluntary  associations,
religions,  corporations,  charities,  work places,  and families.  In these  gov-
ernance structures  lies the answer to  what makes the affiliations  and delib-
erations  of Siegel's  social  movements  rightly  identified  as  constitutional
law. The people's  informal work of persuasion and association through the
means established or protected by the constitution is rightly called constitu-
tional participation.  By expressing  themselves and responding to others in
rallies,  Internet  chat  rooms,  letters  to  legislators;  in local,  state,  and  na-
tional settings; and in secular and religious  communities, the people of this
boisterous  nation constitute ourselves. Explicit  attention  to the design  and
functioning  of these  channels  would  highlight  reforms  needed  to  enable
participation by all the people.
I  look forward  to the  dialogue  Reva Siegel  has initiated.  In the wake
of the confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito to the Court,
it  is high time to remember  Justice  Brennan's  comment:  "It  isn't just me
and  my moral  commitments  speaking;  it is  us."32  How  can the "us"  give
life to our Constitution? With Reva  Siegel's map, we  can, we  will, and  we
must.
32.  See Kathleen M.  Sullivan, Epistemic Democracy and Minority Rights, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 445,
451  (1998)  (quoting Justice  Brennan).
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